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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
 
No. 12-1605 
    
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
KEVIN JACKSON, 
 
        Appellant 
    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:11-cr-00054-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2012 
_______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY JR., and O’MALLEY*, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: September 21, 2012) 
    
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
    
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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O’MALLEY, 
 
Circuit Judge 
Kevin Jackson (“Jackson”) pled guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a 
firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The District Court sentenced 
Jackson to thirty-seven months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.  
Jackson appeals his sentence.  His appointed counsel now moves to withdraw from the 
case under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Third Circuit Local Appellate 
Rule 109.2(a), asserting that all potential grounds for appeal are frivolous.  Jackson has 
filed no pro se brief in response to counsel’s motion.  For the reasons below, we grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm Jackson’s sentence.1
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Since we write primarily for the parties, we recite only the facts necessary to our 
decision. 
On February 26, 2011, police officers approached Jackson while he was standing 
on a street corner in a high-crime area of Wilmington, Delaware.  Jackson ran away.  The 
police officers chased him and saw Jackson pull a fully loaded .45 caliber revolver from 
his waistband and drop it on the street.  To stop him, the police officers tasered Jackson, 
severely injuring him in the process.  Jackson fell into a coma for four days and sustained 
a broken nose, a fractured eye socket, and moderate disability due to brain injury.  At the 
hospital, police officers found PCP on Jackson’s clothes. 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 3742. 
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 On May 24, 2011, the Grand Jury for the District of Delaware returned a one-
count indictment against Jackson charging him with possession of a firearm by a felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Jackson pled guilty to this charge on October 20, 
2011.  The District Court sentenced Jackson on February 23, 2012.  At sentencing, the 
District Court reviewed Jackson’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), adopted its 
findings of fact, and acknowledged the Sentencing Guideline calculation in the report.  
The PSR calculated an offense level of fifteen and placed Jackson in a criminal history 
category of four, making the Sentencing Guideline range for Jackson thirty to thirty-
seven months, with one to three years of supervised release, and a fine range of $4,000 to 
$40,000.  Jackson did not object to the PSR, nor did he move for departure.  Jackson did 
request a downward variance to twenty-four months. 
 The District Court made its sentencing determination on the record and, taking the 
thirty to thirty-seven month range as a starting point, considered the relevant factors set 
out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The District Court considered Jackson’s drug addiction, his 
troubled childhood, the reason he carried a gun, the injuries he sustained during his arrest, 
and his prior sentence in a Delaware State court for a similar crime—possession of a 
deadly weapon by a person prohibited.  Taking all this into account, the District Court 
sentenced Jackson to thirty-seven months of imprisonment, which the District Court 
found was a reasonable and appropriate sentence. 
Jackson appealed his sentence to this Court on February 29, 2012. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 In Anders, the Supreme Court outlined the process for an attorney to withdraw 
from a case in which the indigent criminal defendant she represents wishes to pursue a 
meritless appeal.  If counsel finds the case to be “wholly frivolous, after a conscientious 
examination of it,” she should seek permission to withdraw.  Id. at 744.  “The request 
must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal,” the so-called Anders brief.  Id.  The appellate court must 
then determine, “after a full examination of all the proceedings,” whether counsel’s 
assertion of a meritless appeal is correct.  Id.  If it is, the court may grant counsel’s 
request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.  
The Third Circuit has embraced the Supreme Court’s guidelines in its Local 
Appellate Rules: 
Id. 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that the 
appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion to 
withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), which  must be served upon the appellant and the United States.  The 
United States must file a brief in response.  Appellant may also file a brief in 
response pro se.  After all briefs have been filed, the clerk will refer the case to a 
merits panel.  If the panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant 
counsel’s Anders
3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  Our inquiry on this motion is thus “twofold:  (1) whether 
counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent 
review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  
 motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new 
counsel. 
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 
296, 300 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
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The first question often turns on the adequacy of counsel’s Anders brief.  To fulfill 
the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), the Anders brief must (1) “satisfy the 
court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues” and 
(2) “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.  While counsel must 
examine the record conscientiously, she need not raise and refute every possible claim.  
See id
To perform our independent review of the record, we must determine whether “the 
appeal lacks any basis in law or fact.”  
. 
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 
438 n.10 (1988).  Whether an issue is frivolous is informed by the standard of review for 
each potential claim raised.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 
2002).  We need not scour the record on our review.  “Where the Anders brief initially 
appears adequate on its face, the proper course ‘is for the appellate court to be guided in 
reviewing the record by the Anders brief itself.’”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 301 (quoting United 
States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1996)).  If the Anders brief is inadequate, we 
may seek guidance on potential issues for appeal from defendant’s pro se brief or other 
court filings.  See id.  Regardless of the adequacy of the Anders brief, we may affirm the 
District Court without appointing new counsel if the frivolousness of the appeal is patent.  
See United States v. Coleman
 Jackson’s counsel identified only one potential issue for appeal in her 
, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Anders 
brief:  whether the District Court erred or was unreasonable in imposing its sentence.  
Having reviewed the Anders brief, we are satisfied that counsel has conscientiously 
examined the record.  Accordingly, we limit our independent review of the record to the 
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reasonableness of the District Court’s sentence.  We agree with counsel that this issue 
would be frivolous if raised. 
 We review a District Court’s sentencing decision for procedural and substantive 
reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.  See United States v. Maurer, 639 
F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011).  When imposing a criminal sentence, the district court must 
follow a three-step procedure.  It must:  (1) calculate the applicable Guidelines range; (2) 
formally rule on any departure motions and explain its rulings on such motions; and (3) 
exercise discretion in applying any relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
United States v. Gunter
Jackson’s sentence is also substantively reasonable.  When determining the 
sentence, the District Court considered, among other things, Jackson’s prior three-year 
sentence in a Delaware state court for essentially the same offense—possession of a 
deadly weapon by a person prohibited.  To promote respect for the law, the District Court 
felt its sentence could be no shorter than the three-year state court sentence.  The District 
Court also considered Jackson’s history and characteristics, including his traumatic 
childhood and the injuries he sustained during his arrest; the Court found that neither 
warranted a shorter sentence.  It was persuaded instead by Jackson’s status as a habitual 
criminal under Delaware law.  And, since he fled from police, the Court felt the taser 
, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court did just 
that when sentencing Jackson.  It calculated Jackson’s sentencing range as thirty to thirty-
seven months without objection, determined that there were no motions for departure, 
and considered the relevant factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when ruling on 
Jackson’s request for a variance.  The sentence was procedurally sound. 
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injuries were Jackson’s own fault.  We find these points persuasive as well, and find that 
they reflect the reasonableness of the District Court’s sentence, which was reached 
following proper procedure and was within the applicable Guidelines range. 
 Jackson’s counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders
III. CONCLUSION 
 and Third 
Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) when she filed her motion to withdraw and 
supporting brief.  In her brief, counsel identified no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.  Our 
independent review of the record likewise reveals no such issue.  We thus agree with 
defense counsel that any appeal raised in this case would be frivolous. 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant counsel’s motion and affirm Jackson’s 
sentence. 
